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ABSTRACT 
 Throughout their twenty-five-year insurgency, the Afghan Taliban have evolved 
from a small group of madrasa students, mujahedeen fighters, and tribal Afghans into one 
of the most innovative and adaptive insurgencies in modern history. As a result, the 
U.S.-declared War on Terror in Afghanistan has persisted for eighteen years as the 
Afghan Taliban continue to threaten regional security and stability. In 2019, renewed 
Taliban peace talks with the U.S. may be an indicator for optimism, but the historical 
patterns in Taliban strategy and ideology demand caution. The U.S. government has 
repeatedly underestimated the sophistication, innovation, and resiliency of the Taliban. 
This thesis examines how the Afghan Taliban’s strategies and ideologies have evolved 
since 1994 when the group became an explicit political and military entity. Broken into 
distinct time periods, this thesis chronologically investigates the history of the insurgency 
using the following lenses: Afghan identity, the spread of transnational terrorism, tactical 
innovation, and political ingenuity. Outdated and over-generalized counterinsurgency 
doctrine led to millions of American deaths in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Success 
of future doctrine requires applied awareness of cultural complexities and adversarial 
behaviors. Agility, speed, and responsiveness must become major tenets of 
counterinsurgency planning moving forward. 
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American military planning for the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was built upon 
the belief that the bearded mullahs of the Taliban and al-Qaeda could not effectively 
challenge the power of a modern military for more than a few months. To an extent, the 
U.S. assumption was correct. The Taliban suffered significant losses and retreated into the 
mountains of Pakistan in early 2002. However, the Taliban had risen to power in 
Afghanistan based on their ability to adapt, innovate, and overcome seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles. Strengthening the Taliban narrative of resiliency, they re-
emerged in Afghanistan two years later, prepared to defeat U.S. forces with revolutionized 
tactics and refined ideologies. 
This thesis examines how the Afghan Taliban’s strategy has evolved since 1994 
when they became an explicit political and military entity. Throughout the Taliban’s 
history, they have adapted in numerous ways to further the objectives of their insurgency. 
This thesis examines the Taliban’s strategies during five distinct time periods beginning in 
1994 and ending in the present day. Afghan identity, the spread of transnational terrorism, 
tactical innovation, and political ingenuity provide lenses for which this thesis develops a 
comprehensive analysis of the Taliban’s evolutionary nature. 
A. RELEVANCE  
On September 18, 2001, President Bush signed a joint resolution authorizing 
retaliation against those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Operation 
Enduring Freedom commenced just a few weeks later with a significant bombing campaign 
targeting known terrorist locations throughout Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. Special 
Forces, in coordination with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, waged an extensive assault 
on the ground. 
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban controlled nearly 90% of the 
country. After just two months of intense conflict, the U.S. and Northern Alliance coalition 
had pushed Taliban forces and al-Qaeda leadership into the mountains of Tora Bora and 
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had toppled the Taliban regime within the country. Recognizing their losses, the remaining 
members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership escaped across the border into Pakistan. 
Considering the rapid elimination of Taliban forces as a major military success, 
U.S. policymakers turned their attention to preparations for the ensuing invasion of Iraq. 
Just one year later, in 2003, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to major 
combat operations in Afghanistan.1 These actions indicate the U.S.’s fundamental 
misunderstanding of the resiliency of the Taliban insurgency.  
Meanwhile, the Taliban had been studying American military tactics, developing 
powerful new narratives, and innovating destructive new techniques to counter advanced 
American weaponry. Upon their return to Afghanistan in 2004, the Taliban led devastating 
assaults on coalition forces and changed the tide of the war in favor of their insurgency. 
An extensive understanding of the Taliban’s ability to adapt and innovate against a 
variety of adversaries is vital to the development of future U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. 
This thesis provides one analytical study of the Taliban’s adaptability, but the complexities 
of this particular topic could provide material for dozens of books on counterinsurgency 
strategy.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
To examine the evolution of the Afghan Taliban’s strategy since 1994, this thesis 
will utilize four key lenses to evaluate Taliban actions throughout several specific time 
periods spanning from 1994 to 2019. The first lens this thesis uses to examine Taliban 
adaptations is Afghan identity. As several ethnically and politically influenced militias 
fought for authority during the violent Afghan civil war, the Taliban regime rose to power 
based on a unified nationalist identity. The Taliban’s ability to create a broader identity 
that appealed to large portions of Afghans despite differing ethnic and tribal affiliations is 
the most significant strategy used by the Taliban from 1994 to 1996.  
                                                 




The Taliban’s willingness to create beneficial alliances in periods of resource 
exhaustion is the second lens this thesis uses to analyze the insurgency. The rise of 
transnational terrorism and the international attention it brought to Afghanistan resulted in 
several logistical and political difficulties for the Taliban. In order to offset the challenges 
imposed by UN sanctions and U.S. diplomatic pressure, the Taliban entered a limited 
partnership with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization that provided financial and 
military support for their fight against the Northern Alliance from 1997 to 2001.  
After their swift defeat by U.S. forces in 2002, the Taliban returned to Afghanistan 
armed with innovative tactical strategies. The insurgency’s adaptation of previous 
religious, political, and military policies serves as the third lens for which this thesis studies 
the Taliban organization. The new policies led to significant Taliban victories between 
2002 and 2009, which is the focus of chapter four.  
The final lens pertains to the use of the Taliban’s religious ideology and 
organizational structure as a means of competing for legitimacy against the U.S. sponsored 
government in the capital city of Kabul, Afghanistan. The democratic government of 
Afghanistan, supported by the U.S., is riddled with corruption, lacks infrastructure, and 
fails to provide basic needs to Afghans, especially those in rural areas. The Taliban have 
capitalized on these deficiencies and have adapted their organization to provide services to 
Afghans, strengthening the legitimacy of their insurgency. These adaptations have been 
especially effective following the implementation of new U.S. counterinsurgency policy in 
Afghanistan in 2009. Therefore, this lens is applied to events from 2010 until the present 
day. 
The use of these four lenses within the context of their corresponding periods in 
Taliban history guide this thesis’ analysis of the adaptability of the Taliban regime. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defeating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has been a major priority of U.S. 
foreign policy for the last two decades. As a result, hundreds of scholars have written on 
numerous topics pertaining to the Taliban regime and the U.S. response to Taliban policies 
in Afghanistan. This thesis addresses some of the major arguments made by leading 
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Afghan scholars and insurgency experts in relation to the four lenses guiding the body of 
this research.  
1. Taliban Identity 
Addressing the importance of the Taliban identity, Thomas H. Johnson and M. 
Chris Mason published “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan” in 
2007.2 In the article, Johnson and Mason provide an extensive history of the religious, 
tribal, and ethnic roots of the Taliban insurgency. While the authors acknowledge the 
importance of these factors in the overall character of the Taliban insurgency, they credit a 
single factor for the explanation of the insurgency’s success in Afghanistan. They argue 
that the success of the Taliban insurgency is solely rooted in the charismatic nature of the 
Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. The authors state:  
Thus, unlike most insurgencies, which are not centered in the personality of 
a single leader, the Taliban’s center of gravity, in Clausewitzian terms, is 
not Taliban foot soldiers or field commanders or even the senior clerics 
around Omar, but Omar himself. Because it is a charismatic movement 
socially, if Mullah Omar dies, the Taliban, at least in its current incarnation, 
will wither and die.3  
 The charismatic qualities of Mullah Omar are undeniable and certainly play an 
important role in the rise of Taliban power and influence in Afghanistan. However, to argue 
that the Taliban insurgency lives and dies with Mullah Omar undermines the strong 
nationalist identity which, although cultivated by Omar, is ingrained in the actions of every 
Taliban fighter.  
This thesis expands upon Johnson and Mason’s research of the religious, tribal, and 
ethnic origins of the Taliban. However, it provides an alternate explanation for the success 
of the insurgency embedded in the nationalist objectives of the Taliban movement, not the 
actions of a single leader. 
                                                 
2 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan,” ORBIS 51, no. 1 (January 2007): 71–89. 
3 Ibid., 80. 
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2. Taliban Affiliations   
In “The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,” Neamatollah Nojumi argues that Osama bin 
Laden and his al-Qaeda organization pursued a relationship with the Taliban in the 1990s 
in hopes of creating a broader network for transnational terrorism.4 Nojumi explains, 
“…al-Qaeda was strengthening its roots in Afghanistan and transforming the Taliban 
government into a support system for international militancy and warfare around the 
globe.”5 Nojumi goes on to claim that the Taliban insurgency was “both militarily and 
financially dependent” on support from al-Qaeda until the Taliban’s fall from power after 
the U.S. invasion in 2001. While the link between these two organizations at the end of the 
20th century is irrefutable, the extent to which Nojumi claims al-Qaeda manipulated the 
Taliban organization to serve the needs of its international jihad underestimates the 
sophistication of the Taliban regime. Furthermore, Nojumi’s argument that the Taliban 
were fully dependent on al-Qaeda undercuts the resourcefulness and adaptability of the 
Taliban insurgency.  
In contrast to Nojumi’s argument, this thesis draws on the Taliban’s ability to create 
limited partnerships, which benefited the Taliban in periods of resource depletion, to 
further illustrate the adaptive nature of the Taliban insurgency.  
3. Tactical Innovation 
The changes and innovations made in the Taliban’s strategy after their reemergence 
in Afghanistan in 2004 are the topics of numerous books, scholarly articles, and military 
doctrine. Contemporary authors and their arguments regarding tactical innovation are 
addressed throughout this thesis. However, perhaps the most well-known literature 
pertaining to the tactical strategies of small groups is Mao Tse-tung’s insurgent guidebook, 
On Guerilla Warfare.  
                                                 
4 Neamatollah Nojumi, “The Rise and Fall of the Taliban,” in The Taliban and the Crisis of 
Afghanistan, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2008), 90–117. 
5 Ibid., 113.  
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In On Guerilla Warfare, Mao describes a three-phase plan for organization, 
recruitment, and action against counterinsurgent forces. His phases provide guidelines for 
matters such as gaining intelligence, negotiating with the enemy, and attacking opposing 
forces.6 But, as Taliban engagements with the U.S. military proved to be more 
sophisticated than those anticipated by Mao, the Taliban began to utilize improvised 
bombing technologies and found new ways to avoid Western weaponry. Faced with 
unmanned aerial technology, precision strike missiles, and hardened defensive capabilities, 
the Taliban were forced to strategize beyond Mao’s guerilla tactics.  
This thesis expands upon the tactical changes made by the Taliban, which deviated 
from Maoist strategy, to illustrate the Taliban’s innate ability to recognize the need for 
crucial adjustments in their fighting doctrine. 
4. Political Ingenuity  
Antonio Giustozzi, in a report entitled Afghanistan: Taliban’s Organization and 
Structure, makes the argument that the growing disorderly structure of the Taliban’s 
governance networks, apparent beginning in 2007, has decreased the political unity and 
effectiveness of the insurgency in Afghanistan.7 Discussing the Taliban’s shadow 
government, Giustozzi writes: 
The Taliban does not have a unified shadow government; the Quetta Shura 
and the Rasool Shura both run separate governance systems (pretty weak 
and limited in the case of the latter), while the Miran Shah runs its own 
system only nominally under the supervision of the Quetta Shura. The 
Mashhad Shura up to now has not been doing governance at all.8 
Giustozzi’s claim regarding the unity of the Taliban shadow governments 
throughout Afghanistan is persuasive. However, what Giustozzi fails to iterate is that the 
shadow governments still provided a superior method of government than the elected 
officials in Kabul.  
                                                 
6 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 1961), 41–50. 




Drawing on research regarding the political ingenuity of the Taliban this thesis 
examines the Taliban’s ability to maintain political legitimacy in Afghanistan despite the 
issues cited by Giustozzi. 
D. BACKGROUND 
The Taliban became an official political and military organization in 1994, but the 
historical events which led to the formation of the Taliban are vital in understanding the 
development of the insurgency’s adaptive nature. Many of the Afghans who left their 
homes to join the Taliban also fought in the anti-Soviet jihadist movements of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Their experiences as mujahedeen fighters during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and their experiences during the Afghan civil war that followed, would help 
to develop the character of the Taliban insurgency in the late 20th and 21st centuries.  
1. The Soviet-Afghan War 
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 in the hopes of 
extending communist influence further into Central Asia. For the ten years between 1979 
and 1989 Afghanistan served as a proxy war in the larger context of the Cold War. The 
mujahedeen, a network of Afghan insurgents, fought tirelessly to remove Soviet forces and 
their communist authority from Afghanistan. The U.S., in pursuit of their containment 
strategy, supported the mujahedeen with financial assistance and modern weaponry. 
Throughout the ten-year war, U.S. and Soviet governments poured billions of 
dollars of aid and resources into Afghanistan, but when the Soviet Union began their 
withdrawal in 1988, the artillery, tanks, aircraft, ammunition, etc., were abandoned in 
Afghanistan. These stockpiles of weaponry and military armaments would become 
extremely important in arming the rebels of the Afghan civil war, and eventually the 
Taliban. 
2. The Afghan Civil War 
The Afghan mujahedeen, having waged a successful jihad against the Soviets, 
dispersed throughout the country. Some sought out religious education in madrasas across 
the border in Pakistan, which had been established by the Pakistani government to train 
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religiously-oriented militants during the anti-Soviet jihad.9 Some fighters returned to their 
villages and reintegrated into society. The politically-motivated mujahedeen focused on 
the removal of the Soviet-installed government still present in Kabul. Several embittered 
mujahedeen, who were no longer receiving war-time benefits from the forces that recruited 
them during the Soviet invasion, resorted to criminal activities to raise money. These 
Afghans began demanding payment from store owners, looting shops, raping and beating 
women, and heavily taxing vehicles at numerous locations along major roadways.10 Not 
only did these groups terrorize villagers in Afghanistan, but they also created alliances and 
fought against each other in bloody skirmishes throughout the country.11 
When the Soviet Union officially dissolved in 1991, the pro-communist President, 
Mohammad Najibullah, lost aid from his Soviet supporters who had been providing an 
estimated $4 billion each year and hundreds of aircraft, weaponry, and armored vehicles to 
keep his government afloat.12 Shortly thereafter, in April of 1992 Najibullah resigned his 
position as President of Afghanistan.  
In the wake of Najibullah’s resignation, nearly a dozen political groups emerged 
each with separate political objectives, organized in opposing structures, supported by 
different ethnic groups, and led by scholars, military officers, engineers, and clerics.13 
Afghanistan expert, Barnett Rubin accurately described the post-Soviet period writing, 
“Afghanistan was left with no legitimate state, no national leadership, multiple armed 
groups in every locality, a devastated economy, and a people dispersed throughout the 
region, indeed the world.”14 The U.S. and other international actors attempted to facilitate 
a peaceful transition with the signing of the Peshawar Accords in 1992, but opposing 
                                                 
9 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997 (New York, NY: Oxford 
University, 1999), 14–16. 
10 Ibid., 23. 
11 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University, 2001), 21. 
12 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2002), 109. 
13 Ibid., 208–215. 
14 Ibid., x. 
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Afghan identities inhibited a long-term solution. Consequently, a violent civil war erupted 
as ethnic populations advocated for their own leaders, and the splintering of militia groups 
led to intense fighting between factions.15  
As the bloody civil war and mujahedeen-turned-warlords continued to ravage the 
country, the justice-seeking actions of one particular Afghan came as a breath of fresh air 
for those exhausted from years of conflict. In September of 1994, Mullah Mohammad 
Omar, a former mujahedeen fighter who had returned to a madrasa following the Soviet 
occupation, came across a village which had recently been the victim of brutal violence at 
the hands of warlords. Several narratives exist explaining the actions of Mullah Omar, 
which eventually lead to the creation of the Taliban, The Taliban Phenomenon explains the 
event as such: 
…a Herati family, while on its way to Kandahar from Herat, was stopped 
at a checkpoint ninety kilometers short of Kandahar by local mujahedeen 
bandits. The men and women were separated. The boys were taken away 
and molested. The girls were repeatedly raped until they became 
unconscious. Later all of them were killed and their bodies partially burnt.16 
According to the story, Mullah Omar was the first man to come across the village 
following the incident and sought out several other madrasa students to help bury the 
bodies of the villagers and to bring justice against the criminals who perpetrated the attacks. 
The small group of men who helped Mullah Omar became inspired by his desire to undo 
the injustices of the bandits. Mullah Omar, recognizing broader support for his desire to 
bring justice back to Afghanistan, began the first official steps in creating the Taliban. 
Students and former mujahedeen who had returned to madrasas throughout 
Pakistan and Afghanistan heard of Mullah Omar’s movement and left their schools to 
follow his mission. As his following grew in size he outlined his goals to bring about peace 
to Afghanistan, remove the weaponry used to terrorize the population, enforce sharia law, 
and restore the Islamic nature of the country.17 These key components of the Taliban vision 
                                                 
15 Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997, 4–5. 
16 Ibid., 25. 
17 Rashid, Taliban, 22–23.  
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were supported widely by Afghans who were incredibly frustrated with the current affairs 
within the nation. The group gained followers quickly. Shortly thereafter, in pursuit of their 
nationalist objectives, the Taliban declared themselves a political and military entity in late 
1994.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The body of this thesis analyzes the Taliban organization through five distinct time 
periods, beginning in 1994 until present-day, as a means of chronologically moving 
through the modern history of the insurgency.  
Chapter II discusses the Taliban’s rise to political power from 1994 to 1997. The 
chapter explores the complex factors which make up Afghan identity including religion, 
ethnicity, and tribalism. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates how the Taliban developed a 
comprehensive national identity to unite their followers during one of the most divided 
periods in Afghan history. 
Chapter III examines the Taliban organization from 1997 to 2001 as they faced new 
pressures from international actors and cultivated relationships with beneficial allies. The 
rise of transnational terrorism and the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan during 
this period illustrates the Taliban’s willingness to adapt their ideological and political 
narratives in periods of conflict. 
Chapter IV studies the major political, organizational, social, and tactical 
adaptations made by the Taliban between 2002 and 2009. As the Taliban insurgency 
regrouped and returned to Afghanistan, they operated with revolutionized tactics which 
served several devastating blows to the U.S. counterinsurgency.  
Competing for legitimacy against the U.S.-supported government in Kabul, the 
Taliban have adapted their political infrastructure to undermine efforts of the central 
government. Chapter V analyzes these political strategies executed by the Taliban regime 
from 2010 until the present day.  
11 
The sixth and final chapter provides an overview of the current character of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2019. This chapter culminates in a selection of policy 
recommendations informed by the research provided throughout this thesis.  
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II. THE ROLE OF IDENTITY  
The Afghan Civil War in the 1990s led to the violent deaths of thousands of 
Afghans and represents one of the most divided periods in Afghan history.18 The rebel 
groups who fought for control of the government during the civil war were aligned based 
upon, in large part, ethnic, tribal and political identities. However, due to the great diversity 
of the Afghan population, those groups struggled to obtain broad legitimacy among the 
people. 
In 1994, the Taliban emerged as a nationalist organization, campaigning for the 
establishment of a united government in Afghanistan, the restoration of justice, and the 
incorporation of Islamic jurisprudence in the form of sharia law. Their ideology attempted 
to mitigate ethnic and tribal divisions and bring Afghans together with a uniquely Afghan 
spirit. Bridging differences between tribal confederations and ethnic groups, utilizing the 
charismatic leadership of Mullah Omar, and the use of an overarching Islamic character to 
motivate the Afghan population, the Taliban crafted a sophisticated strategy that defines 
the growth of their insurgency from 1994 to 1996.  
A. ETHNICITY IN THE AFGHAN CIVIL WAR  
Afghanistan is one of the most diverse countries in Asia, both geographically and 
ethnically. The Hindu Kush mountain range separates the country into three main regions. 
The mountain range spans from the country’s northern border with Tajikistan and China, 
runs along its eastern border with Pakistan, and ends in the southern regions of 
Afghanistan’s Helmand Valley. The ridges and valleys of the Hindu Kush provide fertile 
plains, strategic highlands, and arid desert land in the south. Most importantly, spread 
throughout the diverse landscape are over a dozen ethnic groups each comprised of 
numerous tribes and clans.19  
                                                 
18 Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat (New York, NY: Columbia University, 2006), 180. 
19 Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2012), 15. 
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Pashtuns makeup nearly half of the Afghan population and mostly reside in the 
southern and eastern regions of the country.20 The Pashtun population is further divided 
into two main tribal confederations, the Ghilzai and Durrani. The Durrani tribal 
confederation spans throughout southern Afghanistan and combined with the Ghilzai who 
reside mostly in southeastern Afghanistan, account for two-thirds of the Pashtun population 
in Afghanistan. Each confederation is divided into several smaller tribes and then broken 
down even further into numerous clans. For centuries, the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes have 
considered each other rivals and have fought against each other for political authority over 
the Pashtun community. 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Ismailis and several other ethnic groups make 
up the central and northern regions of Afghanistan.21 These groups speak different 
languages and dialects, follow separate tribal codes, and practice different religious 
customs.22 Although each of these groups are Afghan in the geographical sense, they view 
themselves ethnolinguistically, primarily as Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc., first and foremost. 
Throughout history, the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan have united to defeat 
invading empires and occupying forces. However, history has also shown that once foreign 
fighters leave the Afghan homeland, Afghans revert to centuries-old ethnic and tribal-
embittered rivalries.23 As divisive ethnic affiliations remerge after an international 
conflict, the stability of Afghanistan is again challenged by warring factions. This pattern 
is illustrated following the removal of the Soviet-installed government in Afghanistan in 
1992. 
The Taliban Phenomenon describes the environment in Afghanistan following the 
exit of President Najibullah, writing: 
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By the year 1992, the average citizen of Afghanistan was sick and tired of 
the civil war that had been raging for three years…The people had lost faith 
in their leaders, who were making and breaking alliances overnight. They 
found none of them trustworthy as they were not fulfilling their promises, 
some of which had been made in the precincts of the Holy Kaaba…24 
In an attempt to facilitate the peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan, the 
international community and various Afghan political groups signed the Peshawar Accords 
shortly after President Najibullah’s resignation in 1992. The Accords implemented an 
interim government that called for two transitional presidents, serving for a total of six 
months. Following the six-month period, a council would convene to select an interim 
government.25  
The first transitional president, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, was a Pashtun and served 
for two months. The second president, serving for four months, was Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
an ethnic Tajik. Although the Accords outlined a four-month presidency for Rabbani he 
would go on to serve as President of Afghanistan for four years. Many of the insurgent 
groups throughout Afghanistan were exhausted after the decade-long war with the Soviet 
Union and agreed to the short-term solution offered by the Peshawar Accords. 
However, one particular group refused to accept the terms of the Peshawar Accords. 
Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, the leader of the Pashtun organization, Hizb-e-Islami, vehemently 
rejected the Accords, specifically due to the appointment of Burhanuddin Rabbani as the 
second President of Afghanistan. To the Pashtuns of Hizb-e-Islami, Rabbani’s presidency 
was seen as a disgrace to Pashtun political history.  
For 300 years prior to Rabbani’s presidency in 1992, the head of government in 
Afghanistan had been of Pashtun descent. When the Peshawar Accords installed Rabbani 
as President, Hekmetyar quickly organized his militia to remove Rabbani and to ensure the 
return of Pashtun leadership to the capital.26 Hekmetyar’s objection to Rabbani’s 
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presidency led to the breakdown of the entire Peshawar agreement and the eruption of an 
ethnically-charged civil war.  
As Rabbani attempted to create political stability in Kabul, he recognized the 
growing threat from Hizb-e-Islami and appointed Ahmed Shah Massoud as his defense 
minister. Massoud, also a Tajik, had become famous for his heroic actions as a mujahedeen 
fighter in the anti-Soviet jihad. Recognizing Massoud’s reputation and the large Tajik 
coalition he commanded in northern Afghanistan, President Rabbani hoped Massoud’s 
leadership would help to defeat Pashtun opposition. However, Rabbani’s appointment of a 
Massoud further encouraged opposition from the Pashtun population as they grew fearful 
of a government-sanctioned non-Pashtun army in the capital. Throughout the tenure of 
Rabbani’s presidency, Hekmetyar’s forces continually bombed Kabul, killing over 1,000 
Afghans and destroying the city in the process.27  
The destruction left behind from the anti-Soviet jihad in addition to the continuing 
conflict from the civil war greatly inhibited Rabbani’s success as president, and as a result, 
further weakened his legitimacy. The revenue needed to rebuild the city and to support the 
Afghan population never reached Kabul as local warlords and militias kept the money for 
their own purposes. However, despite his lack of popularity, Rabbani’s presidential tenure 
was extended due to the transitional government’s inability to convene while intense 
fighting waged in the capital. When fighting slowed enough for a new election, many 
ethnic groups did not participate as they claimed Rabbani had undue influence in the 
proceedings. In December of 1992, Rabbani was elected as the President of Afghanistan, 
but his presidency was considered illegitimate by many opposing ethnic groups.28  
Despite Afghans’ exhaustion from decades of fighting, the civil war continued and 
increased in brutality as the conflict persisted. For the next two years, commanders changed 
alliances, fought for and lost control of villages, and traded weapons and foreign aid in 
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their quest for political power. Furthermore, Pashtun forces began to fight with each other 
as Pakistan provided aid to select tribes and avoided associations with others.29  
Further complicating the ethnic divisions in the capital, Massoud sought out aid 
from General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, who had served as the commander of the in the 
northern division of the Afghan National Army during the Najibullah presidency. 
Following the decline of Najibullah’s regime, Dostum consolidated power among the 
Uzbek population in the north and created the Jumbesh Party. With the Soviet-provided 
tanks, artillery, and resources left behind, Dostum held control of several major cities in 
northern Afghanistan.30 Massoud recognized the strategic importance of an alliance with 
Dostum and gained his support in 1992. However, in 1994, Dostum severed his alliance 
with Rabbani and Massoud to support Hekmetyar. Dostum would go on to dissolve his 
relationship with Hekmetyar just a few months later. 
Some estimates claim that more than 25,000 people died in the Afghan civil war 
between 1992 and 1994.31 What the warring ethnic factions in Kabul failed to recognize 
was a broader nationalist objective that would appeal to a larger majority of the Afghan 
population. The growth of secularization that had been occurring since the early 1970s,32 
the injustices perpetrated by warlords and gangsters throughout the country, and the 
brutalities of decades of war were ignored as major unifying tenants of Massoud, 
Hekmetyar, Dostum, and Rabbani’s platforms. Instead, they chose to focus on ethnic 
supremacy. So, by the end of 1994, Afghanistan was in desperate need of a consistent and 
ethnically unifying movement that would bring stability and peace back to the country.  
B. ETHNICITY AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN 
When the Taliban emerged in 1994, their policies and recruitment strategies were 
unique to the Afghan landscape and environment. The organization developed 
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revolutionary methods for rallying Pashtun support across the spectrum of separate tribal 
confederations while also encouraging inclusivity of non-Pashtun Afghans. The Taliban 
capitalized on the ethnic complexities of Afghanistan and found ways to lessen hostilities 
through adherence to a religious ideology.  
Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason argue in their article, “Understanding the 
Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” that the Taliban initially represented a tribal 
movement, tied to their leader Mullah Omar’s heritage in the Hotak tribe of the larger 
Ghilzai confederation. They explain: 
To truly understand the Taliban, we must thus go behind the mask of 
Islamism (the Taliban’s opponents in the Northern Alliance were also 
conservative Muslims) and examine the movement as a tribal phenomenon. 
On closer inspection, the Taliban is neither simply a Pashtun movement nor 
even a pan-Ghilzai movement, although its area of influence coincides 
closely with Ghilzai lands. It is largely led by a single tribe. Most of the 
senior leadership of the Taliban—with a few exceptions of Kakar tribesmen 
of the Ghurghusht confederation, who are close to Mullah Omar—was and 
is drawn specifically from Mullah Omar’s own Hotaki tribe.33 
Johnson and Mason correctly point out that the of the core of Taliban leadership 
were Hotaki Pashtuns, and emphasize the tribal connections of the organization in its 
infancy. At the time Johnson and Mason published their article, their analysis was correct. 
However, the Taliban came to realize the need for broader support and began to attract 
Afghans from all backgrounds, further illustrating their adaptability and ingenuity.   
The Taliban exploited ethnic loyalties for their advantage in regions where they had 
tribal connections. For example, they consolidated power in the regions where they had 
strong support from Ghilzai Pashtuns, especially where Omar was well known in the 
Hotaki regions. As the Taliban moved west towards Durrani controlled provinces, they 
found ways to incorporate both Durrani and Ghilzai fighters into their organization to 
                                                 
33 Johnson and Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” 74–78.  
19 
secure broader Pashtun support.34 In Durrani regions, the Taliban permitted provincial 
leadership from Durranis as long as they followed the Taliban’s guidelines.  
Furthermore, in regions with ethnic minorities, the Taliban focused on the 
nationalist and Islamist ideologies of their organization to appeal to the non-Pashtun 
Afghans. In fact, the Taliban issued letters early in their campaign which encouraged all 
Afghans who sought an end to the chaos in the country to join their organization. The letters 
did not pressure Afghans of specific tribes or those with particular ethnic affiliations. 
Instead, the letters welcomed all Afghans who felt passionate about the Taliban mission to 
bring peace, stability, and Islamic law to the country.35 The insurgency’s tailored approach 
to recruitment resulted in unity that was absent in the political militias fighting for power 
in Kabul at the time. 
Supporting the ingenuity of the Taliban’s recruitment strategies was the charismatic 
leadership of Mullah Omar. Omar was a quiet and shy man who spent most of his adult life 
furthering his Islamic education in madrasas, leaving his studies only to fight in the anti-
Soviet jihad and to create the Taliban.36 His pious and dedicated attitude was revered by 
many of Afghans who interacted with him. But, despite his popularity, Omar remained 
humble in his decisions as the leader of the insurgency. He left religious decisions to the 
Islamic scholars of the ulema, he allowed his council to run important meetings and 
interjected only when he felt necessary, and made himself available to Taliban fighters who 
sought his guidance.37 
As Johnson and Mason point out, Omar’s charismatic leadership was extremely 
important in the expansion of the Taliban insurgency. They go so far as to say that the 
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Taliban would not exist without the leadership of Omar.38 But, what Johnson and Mason 
attribute to solely charisma is in fact only one aspect of the larger strategic strength of the 
united Taliban organization.  
C. MILITARY EXPANSION 
Winston Churchill, in his book The Story of the Malakand Field Force, describes 
his encounters with Pashtun villagers as the British military attempted to conquer the North 
West Frontier in the late 19th century. Churchill tells a story of the conquering nature of 
the Pashtun people writing: 
He becomes a man to be feared. Then he builds a tower to his house and 
overawes those around him in the village. Gradually they submit to his 
authority. He might now rule the village; but he aspires still higher. He 
persuades or compels his neighbors to join him, in an attack on the castle of 
a local khan. The attack succeeds. The khan flies or is killed, the castle 
captured. The retainers make terms with the conqueror. The land tenure is 
feudal. In return for their acres they follow their new chief to war. Were he 
to treat them worse than the other khans treated their servants, they would 
sell their strong arms elsewhere. He treats them well. Others resort to him. 
He buys more rifles. He conquers two or three neighboring khans. He has 
now become a power.39  
Churchill’s account of the Pashtun villagers eerily matches the attitude of Mullah 
Omar and the Taliban as they traveled north in late 1994. Having attained a persuasive and 
inclusive narrative, Taliban forces began their military campaign and moved north with the 
ultimate goal of capturing the Afghan capital of Kabul. 
In October of 1994, the Taliban celebrated their first military defeat after capturing 
the town of Spin Boldak along the southern portion of the Afghan-Pakistan border. Stored 
in Spin Boldak, the Taliban seized the arms supply of Hekmetyar with the support of the 
Pakistani officials in the town. Hekmetyar’s stash included large amounts of weaponry and 
ammunition.40 Prior to their success at Spin Boldak, the Taliban were organically Afghan 
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both in funding and in support.41 However, impressed by the Taliban’s swift actions in 
Spin Boldak and encouraged by their justice-seeking motives, the Pakistani government 
took note of the Taliban’s growing influence in southern Afghanistan. 
Early in November of 1994, in need of Afghan support, the Pakistan government 
called on Mullah Omar and his followers to help free a Pakistani convoy which had been 
hijacked and held for ransom by warlords outside of Kandahar.42 When the Taliban 
arrived, the hijackers attempted to escape but were quickly captured by Taliban insurgents 
and put to death. Their bodies were displayed within the town as a symbol of the justice 
performed by the Taliban for the townspeople. The Taliban continued on the road into the 
heart of Kandahar where they removed the main militia comprised of nearly 2,500 men, 
and took control of the city.43 The capture of Kandahar marked the first major victory for 
the Taliban. 
Kandahar, a former Soviet stronghold, provided the Taliban with several substantial 
additions to their military capabilities. Stockpiled in the former Kandahar Soviet airbase, 
the Taliban found several fighter aircraft and helicopters, advanced weaponry, armored 
vehicles, and ammunition. In need of training for such advanced equipment, the Taliban 
enlisted the help of fighters who had defected from Afghan armed forces after the fall of 
Najibullah’s government. These men provided expertise and training in subjects such as 
airpower, artillery, and tanks to other members of the Taliban.44  
In control of Kandahar, the Taliban patrolled the major highways around the city 
to ensure fair passage and instituted Sharia law for those living within the city limits. As 
the first example of what a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would look like, Kandahar 
became the home base for Taliban operations. At this point, having secured the second-
largest city in Afghanistan, the Taliban had caught the attention of warring factions in 
Kabul, Afghan villagers, Pakistani madrasa students, the Pakistani government, and 
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Muslim donors in Saudi Arabia.45 Pakistani madrasa students crossed the border in 
Afghanistan and made their way to Taliban controlled areas. It was at this time that Mullah 
Omar declared the Taliban an official political entity in Afghanistan. 
In March of 1995, the Taliban traveled north towards the town of Herat located in 
western Afghanistan. However, the Taliban faced significant challenges as they neared 
Herat. Having heard of the Taliban’s success in Kandahar and their movements toward 
Herat, Ismail Khan, the ruling commander in Herat, called for reinforcements from 
commanders in Kabul. Receiving the aid, Khan was able to protect the city and the Taliban 
suffered substantial losses due to superior airpower and manpower in Herat. Riding their 
initial success against the Taliban, Ismail Khan attempted to attack the Taliban in October 
of 1995 in an effort to capture Kandahar. However, his plan backfired as he underestimated 
the strength of Taliban forces in Kandahar. Not only did Khan lose men in his efforts to 
capture Kandahar, but his over-extension left Herat vulnerable. In September of 1995, the 
Taliban took control of Herat with the support of General Dostum, who defected from his 
alliance with Hekmetyar.46  At the time, Dostum had control of several Soviet aircraft that 
provided critical support as the Taliban conducted their assault on Herat. 
For months, the Taliban had been attempting to make their way towards Kabul but 
had been met with fierce fighting by opposition forces in the capital. The Taliban were 
believed to be suffering from poor leadership, lack of structure, and inexperienced fighters 
in comparison to the pro-government forces in Kabul.47 Using their experiences to learn 
for future engagements, the Taliban focused their efforts on capturing provinces 
surrounding Kabul.  
The Taliban continued to advance throughout Afghanistan, capturing Jalalabad, a 
town roughly 100 miles east of Kabul, in August 1996. Following their success in 
Jalalabad, the Taliban took control of four provinces surrounding Kabul. After securing 
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Sarobi in September 1996, the Taliban were a mere 45 miles outside the city limits of 
Kabul.48  
Recognizing the need to consolidate and enhance his authority, Mullah Omar took 
several actions to strengthen the Taliban narrative throughout Afghanistan prior to the 
Taliban’s assault on Kabul. Fulfilling his promise to the Taliban’s earliest followers, Omar 
officially changed the name of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996, 
signifying the reestablishment of Islamic purity in the country.49 And, solidifying his 
image as the divine leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar entered the shrine in Kandahar that 
housed the cloak of the Prophet Muhammad, one of the holiest sites in Islam. With the 
cloak in his arms, Mullah Omar brought it to a rooftop for the townspeople to view. The 
public showing of the cloak, which had been viewed by only a few people in Afghan history 
and had not been removed from its safe since 1932, solidified Mullah Omar’s legitimacy 
to his followers. They began calling him Commander of the Faithful, a title reserved for 
the most influential and pious leaders in Islamic history.50 
The Taliban leadership also put renewed effort into enforcing their strict 
interpretations of sharia law as a means hardening Taliban authority in their southern 
territories. The General Department for the Preservation of Virtue and the Elimination of 
Vice was created to ensure order within Taliban-controlled cities.51 Those who broke the 
laws were often publicly executed or amputated in town squares. Men were required to 
grow their beards, women were no longer allowed to participate in public events and were 
forced to wear conservative burqas. In efforts to remove all outside influence, Taliban 
members collected televisions, VCRs, non-religious books, movies, and tapes, and set fire 
to them in town centers.  
Meanwhile, Massoud recognized the strength of the Taliban as they rallied outside 
of Kabul and ordered the evacuation of the capital. He also called for the rejuvenation of 
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the United Islamic Front, an alliance that had formed to oust the Soviet government in 
Afghanistan in 1992. The coalition became known as the Northern Alliance and was 
comprised of northern Hazaris, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. However, Massoud’s coalition was not 
strong enough to counter the Taliban forces outside of Kabul.52 
On September 26, 1997, only days after their seizure of Sarobi, the Taliban entered 
the capital from several directions and were met with little opposition.53 Their success in 
Kabul meant that the Taliban controlled nearly three-fourths of the country by the end of 
1996. The Taliban had swept across Afghanistan while capitalizing on the ethnic civil war 
which occupied the major military forces within the country. Before garnering the attention 
of opposition, the Taliban were able to develop their religious mission, arm themselves 
with significant stockpiles of advanced Soviet weaponry, and solidify a strong support base 
made up ethnically-diverse Afghan citizens. But by 1997 those conditions had significantly 
changed, no longer in favor of Mullah Omar and his Taliban followers. 
The Taliban struggled to establish a government that could effectively oversee all 
of the territories they had amassed between 1994 and 1996. The puritanical interpretation 
of Islam being enforced by the provincial leaders led to waves of dissent. The brutal 
punishments of the Taliban-implemented sharia laws were causing Afghans to flee their 
controlled cities. Furthermore, continued engagements with the Northern Alliance had 
destroyed cities, and the Taliban failed to reconstruct infrastructure without proper funding 
and support.54  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Taliban’s unifying nationalist identity no longer sufficiently supported the 
Taliban’s objectives. So, the leadership worked to develop a new strategy as they pursued 
their political goals, calling on international sponsors and further developing their 
relationship with the Saudi millionaire they had been harboring, Osama bin Laden.  
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III. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM  
Taliban forces had swept through Afghanistan between 1994 and 1996, and now, 
controlling nearly eighty percent of the country, the demands of governance began to weigh 
on Taliban leadership.55 The rebuilding of infrastructure damaged from years of conflict, 
the need to raise revenue, and the requirements of providing healthcare and other services 
meant the Taliban needed resources they could not acquire on their own. Moreover, new 
attention brought to the Taliban regime and their strict ideological practices alienated the 
insurgency from potential sources of international aid and support.  
Mullah Omar, faced with the need to adapt his insurgency, cautiously sought new 
alliances and limited partnerships with actors who were willing to bring the necessary 
resources to Afghanistan. For a time, these partnerships benefited Omar and the 
insurgency, but with the turn of the millennium, Omar’s judgements would come to 
backfire on the Taliban organization.  
A. INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION 
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, shortly after Madeleine Albright was 
appointed as the U.S. Secretary of State in January of 1997, a diplomat working for her 
administration was quoted as saying the U.S. had “no policy” in Afghanistan.56 At the 
time, the U.S. government had been aware of the growing power of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan but hoped the group would bring stability to Kabul in the midst of civil war.  
However, in November of 1997, Albright visited a refugee camp on the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While speaking with women and children who fled the 
Taliban regime Albright learned of some of the group’s harshest sharia policies. Quoted in 
an article published in the New York Times, Albright states, “It’s very clear why we’re 
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opposed to Taliban. We’re opposed to their approach to human rights, to their despicable 
treatment of women and children and their lack of respect for human dignity, in a way more 
reminiscent of the past than the future.”57 The statement by Albright represented the first 
strongly anti-Taliban statement made by the U.S. government. As a former refugee herself, 
Albright returned to the U.S. with a new, anti-Taliban agenda.  
Albright’s visit was the first in a string of events that brought greater attention to 
the Taliban. The international community began to learn more about the Taliban ideology, 
and as a result, the insurgency faced new difficulties in adapting to varying demands within 
Afghanistan.  
B. ADAPTATIONS: BIN LADEN AND AL-QAEDA  
As Mullah Omar struggled with finding new resources to support his regime and 
wrestled with administrative demands, the insurgency continued to wage war with the 
military forces of the Northern Alliance. Yet, progress became stagnant as the Northern 
Alliance withstood continual assaults by Taliban forces. In 1996, Mullah Omar met Osama 
bin Laden, with whom he would begin to develop a limited partnership in order to further 
the Taliban’s greater military and political objectives. 
Osama bin Laden was the son of a wealthy Yemeni businessman who owned and 
operated one of the largest construction firms throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Among other projects, the bin Laden family business was responsible for the expansion 
and maintenance of the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina.58 As a pious student of 
Islamic studies, Osama bin Laden travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight in the anti-
Soviet jihad. Using his family’s connections and wealth, bin Laden helped to buy weapons 
and provide limited resources to the Afghan mujahedeen. Inspired by his experiences in 
Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia to work for the family business as he 
continued to support jihadist goals worldwide.  
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When Saudi Arabia allowed the entrance of U.S. forces into the kingdom following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden publically denounced the Saudi Royal Family. In 
1992, bin Laden left for Sudan after ruining his relationships with much of the Royal 
Family, who eventually terminated his citizenship in 1994. As bin Laden continued to 
speak out against Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the U.S., the Royal Family pressured 
Sudan to expel him from their country as well. The Sudanese government complied in 
1996.59 
When bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, he sought residence in Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan, with comrades he met during the anti-Soviet jihad. It was in Jalalabad where 
Mullah Omar and bin Laden crossed paths for the first time as the Taliban seized control 
of the city in late 1996.60 In the fall of 1996, when the Taliban took control of Kabul, bin 
Laden declared bayat, a term signifying loyalty and allegiance, to Omar and the Taliban 
organization as they fought the Northern Alliance. 
However, bin Laden had made a reputation for himself with his severe political 
outbursts. The negative international attention he received was the main reason he sought 
safe haven in Afghanistan in the first place. Playing on Omar’s tribal Pashtunwali customs 
of hospitability and protection, bin Laden asked for continued shelter in Afghanistan. 
Notoriously cautious of outsiders, Omar recognized that he would need to keep a watchful 
eye on bin Laden, but allowed him to stay in Afghanistan.  
Busy tending to his Afghan insurgency, Omar urged bin Laden to keep a low profile 
and to avoid bringing undue attention to Afghanistan. In 1997, Mullah Omar requested the 
relocation of bin Laden to the Taliban operational headquarters in Kandahar.61 
Nonetheless, while Omar focused on his insurgency bin Laden began to develop the 
transnational mission of his budding al-Qaeda terrorist network. Specifically, bin Laden 
began planning devastating attacks on international targets, unbeknownst to Mullah Omar.  
                                                 
59 Rashid, Taliban, 133. 
60 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Feliz Kuehn, Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of 
Success in Afghanistan (New York, NY: Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 
https://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/gregg_sep_tal_alqaeda.pdf. 
61 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report. 
28 
a. Bin Laden’s Fatwas  
The first indicators of bin Laden’s growing transnational terrorist organization 
came when he issued extremist fatwas against the U.S. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.62 
The fatwas were in response to the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which bin 
Laden vehemently opposed. The fatwas caught the attention of the Saudi monarchy and 
officials in the U.S. government, the attention that Omar had specifically warned against. 
Bin Laden’s actions frustrated Omar as they directly defied his requests to maintain a low 
profile in Afghanistan.63  
In an attempt to maintain the relationship with Omar, bin Laden began to support 
the Taliban insurgency in several ways. In Kandahar, bin Laden agreed to finance the 
building of two mosques which appealed to the religious ideologies of the Taliban. 
Furthermore, bin Laden connected Omar with other wealthy Saudis who were willing to 
support the Taliban both financially and logistically.64  
The turbulent relationship between the two leaders continued throughout the latter 
half of the 1990s. But, Omar continued to provide safe-haven to bin Laden as their 
relationship evolved into a beneficial military partnership.  
b. Brigade 055 
The 055 Brigade signifies one of the strongest associations between al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban and proved to be of tremendous benefit to the Taliban insurgency. The 055 
Brigade was as a contingent of fighters, educated in al-Qaeda training camps, and 
incorporated into the ranks of the Taliban insurgency specifically for the purpose of 
defeating the Northern Alliance. The brigade was comprised of some of the most 
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experienced fighters from within the two organizations.65 Rohan Gunaratna describes the 
makeup of the brigade in his book, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He writes:  
055 Brigade was drawn from two overlapping generations of Afghan 
veterans: the first, who had driven out the Russians, and the second, 
generally better educated, who had fought elsewhere—e.g. Kashmir, 
Daghestan, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh—but had been trained in 
Afghanistan.66 
The brigade quickly earned the reputation of being one of the most devoted and 
ruthless groups of fighters within the Taliban and al-Qaeda ranks.67 The highly-trained 
fighters became an integral component of the Taliban fighting forces and served as the 
spearhead for the insurgencies military operations. The 055 Brigade cemented the 
association between al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the late 1990s.  
c. African Embassy Bombings  
In June 1998, Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia flew to Kandahar to meet with 
Mullah Omar to discuss the Taliban’s growing relationship with bin Laden. Bin Laden’s 
fatwas, issued from his hideout in Afghanistan, claimed the Saudi Royal family were not 
legitimate rulers of the Saudi Kingdom. As a result, Prince Turki met with Omar to demand 
bin Laden be turned over for criminal proceedings in Saudi Arabia. According to Prince 
Turki’s account, Omar agreed to turn bin Laden over if Saudi Arabia provided an outline 
for the Islamic proceedings he would face once in their custody. Negotiations between the 
Taliban and Saudi government continued through July of 1998.68 Meanwhile, al-Qaeda 
leadership concentrated on plans which would bring new levels of international attention 
to their jihad, and consequently, negative attention to the Taliban.  
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In August of 1998, al-Qaeda perpetrated two simultaneous attacks on U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks resulted in the 
death of 224 people, twelve of whom were U.S. citizens, and wounded several thousand 
others.69 Bin Laden had been on the radar of U.S. intelligence agencies prior to the 
embassy bombings, but the execution of the attacks resulted in a worldwide campaign to 
bring bin Laden to justice. Known to be providing safe-haven to bin Laden, the 
international community focused their attention on the Taliban in Afghanistan for 
assistance in attaining custody of bin Laden. Again, Mullah Omar protected bin Laden and 
refused to give up his location to international authorities without a proper Islamic judicial 
proceeding.  
C. INCREASING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE  
One week after the bombings on the African embassies, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council passed a resolution in response to the attacks. UN Resolution 1189 called 
for a coordinated response in order to prevent the growth of international terrorism.70 The 
al-Qaeda bombings in Africa served as a serious indicator for many countries that the 
growth of transnational terrorism was becoming a significant threat to state security and 
international peace in the wake of the Cold War.  
The increased anti-terrorism efforts by the international community led to amplified 
pressure on the Taliban to hold bin Laden accountable for his actions in Africa. The Taliban 
demanded evidence from the U.S. to bring charges against bin Laden in an Islamic court. 
However, the U.S. denied the Taliban’s request and kept the details of their embassy 
investigations secret. As a result, the Taliban claimed they could not hold bin Laden 
responsible, and they declared him an innocent man in Afghanistan.71 
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Just weeks after the passing of Resolution 1189, the UN Security Council convened 
again and passed Resolution 1193, specifically addressing the Taliban’s extremist policies 
in Afghanistan. The resolution called for an immediate cease-fire between warring 
elements in the country and an end to international intervention that did not support broader 
peace attempts.72 Throughout the remainder of 1998 and into 1999, The UN Security 
Council continued to pass resolutions denouncing the actions of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
1. Mazar-i Sharif and Recognition of the Taliban Government 
As the UN assembled to draft the resolutions against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the 
insurgency focused on territorial gains in northern Afghanistan. Taliban forces had reached 
an impasse with Northern Alliance troops both sides of the conflict suffered casualties with 
little measurable progress. So, the Taliban refocused their attention on the city of Mazar-i 
Sharif, which had been under the control of the serial defector, General Dostum, and his 
Uzbek militia for a majority of the civil war.  
While strategizing for their attack on the city, the Taliban discovered one of 
Dostum’s top commanders, Abdul Malik, was part Pashtun. In 1997, playing on Malik’s 
Pashtun loyalties, the Taliban were able to persuade Malik to defect from Dostum’s militia. 
Recognizing the major implications of Malik’s defection, Dostum consequently fled the 
country and the Taliban were able to enter Mazar-i Sharif with a significant strategic 
advantage.73  
The insurgency quickly set to work installing a sharia government in Mazar-i Sharif 
and began to disarm and dismantle Malik’s Uzbek militia. Angered by the Taliban’s actions 
against his fighters and regretful of his betrayal, Malik mobilized his remaining forces to 
counterattack the Taliban. What ensued was an intense and devastating series of battles 
between Malik’s forces and the Taliban. Eventually, the Taliban defeated Malik, but both 
sides suffered significant losses.  
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Despite the loss of hundreds of fighters, the Taliban’s success as Mazar-i Sharif 
caught the attention of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The three 
countries each declared the Taliban government the legitimate governing body in 
Afghanistan following the capture.74 
2. Taliban Ideology and the West 
Although Mazar-i Sharif represented a military success and led to the validation of 
the Taliban by several important Islamic nations, they continued to struggle on the 
domestic and international front. The fundamentalist religious ideology of the Taliban 
continued to directly affect the growth of their insurgency.  
In the late 1990s and beginning of 2000, Omar genuinely pursued positive 
relationships with the U.S. and the western world. Omar’s aspirations for the Taliban 
remained centered in the Afghan context, and he did not seek to expand his influence past 
the borders of Afghanistan unlike the goals of Osama bin Laden. In an attempt to appeal to 
the international community, especially the UN with whom they hoped to receive official 
recognition, the Taliban ordered the destruction of the poppy plant in the summer of 2000.  
The poppy plant, which produces opium, supported many Afghan farmers and 
fueled the drug trade in and out of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership 
ordered the destruction of poppy fields throughout the country as it violated the Islamic 
tenants of their ideology. The adverse effects of the Taliban’s decision were seen 
throughout the country as farmers lost their main source of income at the hands of the 
insurgency. However, the international community applauded the Taliban’s efforts to 
decrease the international drug market.75  
Furthermore, recognition of the Taliban government from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates led Omar to seek broader acceptance from the international 
community. Omar believed that recognition of his government would help to bring much-
needed aid to Afghanistan which he could use to begin rebuilding the country. So, the 
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Taliban extended several invitations to U.S. officials to discuss the future of U.S. and 
Afghan relations.  
Still weary from the African embassy bombings and the Taliban’s refusal to turn 
over bin Laden, the U.S. met with Taliban officials to discuss mutual terms for progress. 
After discussions with U.S. officials, the Taliban released information on their 
insurgency’s main priorities, many of which directly coincided with the concerns of the 
U.S. and other western powers. Topics such as the fair treatment of women and the 
denouncement of state-sponsored terrorism were included in the list of Taliban priorities. 
The U.S., however, was unimpressed. They found the policies to be unconvincing as the 
Taliban viewed the topics through an Islamic perspective that did not satisfy western 
standards.76 Failing to cement a positive relationship with the broader international 
community, the Taliban continued to face pressure from western sources. 
In October of 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267, which placed 
sanctions on the those associated with bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization including 
the Taliban government which provided him safe-haven. The sanctions delivered a 
devastating blow to the already struggling Afghan economy. The sanctions also 
strengthened negative sentiments toward western governments who Mullah Omar now saw 
as directly objecting the establishment of the Taliban’s Islamic government.77 The 
sanctions worked as a final straw in the Taliban’s attempts to seek international legitimacy 
and pushed the group closer to the Islamist supporters with whom they had previously 
attempted to keep at a distance, mainly bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. 
3. USS Cole Bombing 
While Omar and the Taliban focused on appealing to foreign governments, bin 
Laden had been working diligently on his plans for two major attacks against U.S. assets. 
The first was against the USS Cole, a U.S. guided-missile destroyer refueling in the port 
city of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000. Three al-Qaeda insurgents loaded a small boat with 
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C4 explosives, drove the explosive-ridden boat within close proximity of the USS Cole 
and detonated the bombs, killing themselves and leaving a massive hole in the side of the 
ship. Seventeen American sailors were killed in the explosion and another thirty were 
injured.78 The Cole bombing greatly intensified U.S. counterterrorism efforts against al-
Qaeda who claimed responsibility for the attack. But, the presidential election of 2000 
dominated U.S. political attention in November of 2000, and bin Laden prepared for his 
second, and much more lethal attack against the U.S. 
D. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda associates perpetrated the largest terrorist attack 
ever carried out on U.S. soil. The hijacking and suicidal actions of the terrorists resulted in 
the deaths of nearly 3,000 American citizens and wounded several thousand more in New 
York City, Washington, DC, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The international response to 
the attacks mobilized the entire global community to bring bin Laden and his terrorist 
network to justice. The intensified pursuit of bin Laden brought extreme pressure and 
attention to Afghanistan, where the Taliban continued to shelter the mastermind 
responsible for the attacks. 
Newly elected U.S. President George W. Bush called on Mullah Omar to hand over 
bin Laden so that he may be brought to justice for the crimes committed against the United 
States. Omar refused demands for bin Laden’s whereabouts, offering only to extradite him 
to a Muslim country where he would face charges in an Islamic court.79 President Bush 
refused Omar’s offer and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom 
commenced less than a month later on October 7, 2001.  
While Mullah Omar recognized the possible repercussions of his connections to al-
Qaeda in the wake of September 11, Omar refused to give up bin Laden without concrete 
proof that he was behind the attacks, which Omar believed the U.S. did not have.80 
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Furthermore, the U.S. adopted a mentality that those who did not support the U.S.’ efforts 
to bring bin Laden to justice were considered enemies of the U.S. Therefore, Omar’s failure 
to turn over bin Laden, due in part to Pashtunwali customs which call for unconditional 
protection of guests, led the U.S. to focusing their War on Terror on not only the al-Qaeda 
network but the Taliban as well.81 
The Northern Alliance, who had steadily been establishing a relationship with the 
CIA, became integral in the U.S.’ campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. A 
presidential finding signed by President Bush in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 
permitted the covert insertion of members of the CIA’s Special Activities Divisions (SAD) 
and U.S. Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) just days after the terrorist attack. On 
September 26, 2001, SAD paramilitary members began their assault in Afghanistan. The 
CIA used the regional expertise of the Northern Alliance to create relationships with 
important tribal leaders in northern Afghanistan and to gather intelligence for the larger 
American invasion that would occur in October 2001.  
The initial bombing campaign led by the U.S. focused on eliminating the strategic 
headquarters of the Taliban and cutting off military resources to the insurgency. Dick Camp 
describes the first steps taken by the U.S. in his book Boots on the Ground. Camp writes: 
The bombing focused primarily on “Taliban air defenses, facilities 
physically and symbolically associated with Mullah Omar and UBL 
[Osama bin Laden], and al-Qaeda training camps,” according to General 
DeLong. Strikes were reported in the capital, Kabul (where electricity was 
cut off), at the airport and military nerve center of Kandahar (home of the 
Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Omar), and also in the city of Jalalabad 
(military/terrorist training camps).82 
The power of the modern American military and their coalition allies devastated 
the Taliban’s mostly rural insurgency. While the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters could 
maneuver the Afghan terrain better any other force, they could not escape the precision of 
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U.S. airstrike capabilities as they hit airfields, training camps, high-valued leadership, and 
other important targets throughout the country. 
By December of 2001, the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda had 
effectively toppled the Taliban government in Afghanistan and had pushed their remaining 
forces into the mountains of Tora Bora along the Pakistani border. The cavernous networks 
within the mountains of Tora Bora provided bin Laden and Mullah Omar with an advantage 
as they attempted to escape from heavy fighting. CIA planners for the battle at Tora Bora 
told President Bush that no army in the world could completely seal the mountain range to 
prevent the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s escape.83 Months later, U.S. officials would state that 
several thousand additional troops would have been required to effectively prevent bin 
Laden and Omar’s escape. Recognizing that the terrorists were weak, tired, and seemingly 
cornered in the mountains, the CIA pleaded with American military planners to send more 
troops and air power to complete a final sweep of the remaining insurgents. However, the 
U.S. military denied the CIA’s requests in fear of angering the Afghan population with a 
large military insertion, and thus, Omar and bin Laden were able to escape across the border 
into Pakistan.84 
E. CONCLUSION 
Mullah Omar and his Taliban insurgency amassed significant territorial gains and 
political legitimacy within Afghanistan between 1994 and 1997 due to strategic planning 
and ample military resources. As the priorities and responsibilities of the Taliban shifted 
in 1997 to accommodate the vast new territory under their control, the insurgency struggled 
to adapt. Seeking new alliances and resources, the Taliban entered into a partnership with 
Osama bin Laden, which would prove to be one of the insurgencies most defining 
moments.  
The Taliban’s failed attempts to facilitate agreements and alliances with the 
international community and the increasing antagonist actions of bin Laden in Afghanistan 
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led to extreme levels of international pressure. Following the terrorist actions of al-Qaeda 
on September 11, 2001, and Mullah Omar’s refusal to turn bin Laden over to U.S. 
authorities, an action that some of the Taliban’s moderate fighters did not support, the 
Taliban regime was effectively toppled during Operation Enduring Freedom.  
However, the lessons learned by Mullah Omar and the rest of the Taliban leadership 
during this period would influence new strategies and ideologies as the organization 
regrouped and prepared to return to Afghanistan.  
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IV. TACTICAL INNOVATION  
In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the invasion of Afghanistan 
in Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban insurgency was a shadow of its pre-2001 
regime. Mullah Omar disappeared into the mountains of Pakistan with what remained of 
his core leadership. The U.S.-led coalition lost only twelve soldiers during OEF, liberated 
every territory that was previously under Taliban control, and destroyed the military 
capabilities and logistical networks the insurgency had spent eight years creating.85 
Political and military leaders in the U.S. celebrated the hasty defeat of the Taliban 
and focused on creating a democratic Afghan government and developing infrastructure 
that would bring stability to the country. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
announced the end to major conflict in Afghanistan in 2003 and closed the metaphorical 
book on the existence of the Taliban insurgency. In fact, Rumsfeld had initiated planning 
for the invasion of Iraq while the battle in Tora Bora was still taking place in November 
2001.86 So, as the Taliban retreated into Pakistan, the U.S. began to redirect 
counterinsurgency efforts toward planning for their next military endeavor.  
In Pakistan, the Taliban insurgency was injured, but it was not defeated. Mullah 
Omar slowly began planning and organizing for the Taliban’s eventual return to 
Afghanistan. Consequently, the period between 2002 and 2009 marks the most innovative 
and adaptive period in the Taliban insurgency. Psychologically motivated by their defeat 
at the hands of the U.S., the Taliban worked persistently in Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
to find new lethal and inventive measures to defeat the modern military capabilities of 
the U.S. 
When the Taliban re-emerged in Afghanistan in the summer of 2004, they had a 
reinvigorated spirit, strengthened ideology, and destructive new technologies that dealt a 
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devastating blow to U.S. counterinsurgency forces in the country and walked back the 
progress of three years of U.S. nation-building efforts.  
A. THE BONN AGREEMENT 
The removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan led to the need for a new 
governing body in Kabul. Accordingly, the U.S. and UN helped to facilitate the Bonn 
Agreement, officially known as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, in 
December of 2001. The conference, held in Bonn, Germany, was intended to appoint an 
interim government that would eventually form a long-term, democratically-elected 
government for Afghanistan. The convention included representatives from the numerous 
ethnic groups throughout Afghanistan in hopes of creating an inclusive government that 
would guard against the outbreak of another civil war.  
The interim government, led by Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, was to govern for six 
months at which point a traditional Afghan council, called a loya jirga, would convene to 
elect a transitional government body.87 Karzai was not a new face in the Afghan political 
sphere, his father had been a member of parliament prior to the Soviet invasion, and Hamid 
considered himself a political analyst.88 When the Taliban first emerged in the mid-1990s, 
Karzai supported the insurgency, even giving money and weaponry to the cause. However, 
as the Taliban became more violent and oppressive, Karzai’s father began to speak out 
against the insurgency. In 1999, Taliban operatives killed Karzai’s father due to his 
negative public remarks against the group. As the Taliban’s reign of terror continued, 
Karzai became a potential leader for a Pashtun-led resistance to the Taliban.89 The CIA 
maintained a relationship with Karzai throughout the early 2000s. So, when the Bonn 
conference convened, Karzai arrived in Bonn groomed by U.S. intelligence experts to lead 
the post-Taliban reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
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When Hamid Karzai returned to Afghanistan following the Bonn Agreement, he 
began to create policy within the country. One of his decisions included the distribution of 
government responsibilities to regional leaders throughout the country. In theory, Karzai’s 
plan would work to satisfy the divisions among Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal groups by 
empowering local leaders. However, what resulted was eerily similar to the situation 
following the removal of Soviet troops in the 1980s. Theo Farrell describes the fallout of 
Karzai’s decision: 
In this way, the corrupt warlords who had been pushed out of power by the 
Taliban in the 1990s returned as local governors and police chiefs. Under 
the guise of officialdom, these reincarnated figures once again stole from 
and abused the population. This, in turn, provided fertile ground for the 
gradual return of the Taliban into southern and eastern Afghanistan 
beginning in 2004.90 
The legitimacy given to regional governors through Karzai’s policies returned the 
countryside of Afghanistan to the post-Soviet lawlessness that inspired the rise of the 
Taliban nearly a decade earlier. These corrupt leaders then appointed their cronies to other 
important positions within their regional administrations and thus the larger government 
structure weakened in functionality and validity.91  
In major cities, Karzai’s government attempted to return modernity that had been 
turned back by the destruction of infrastructure and strict anti-technology policies of the 
Taliban regime.92 Although, systemic corruption of the Karzai administration limited 
positive growth and primed the political environment of Afghanistan for the return of the 
Taliban. Counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. focused on assisting Karzai in rebuilding 
Afghanistan, meanwhile, the Taliban were quietly reorganizing across the border.  
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B. RETURN OF THE TALIBAN: 2001–2004 
Despite suffering from battle injuries and the psychological effects of rapid defeat, 
the Taliban continued to adapt their insurgency in 2002. Various accounts of the initial 
actions taken to revive the insurgency exist.93 However, most accounts note that members 
of the original insurgency were reluctant to return to conflict. Some Taliban fighters had 
escaped across borders during OEF and others hid in plain sight by reintegrating into 
Afghan society. So, the Taliban reached out to new recruits, forming what Antonio 
Giustozzi has labeled the “Neo-Taliban.” 
The reinvigorated insurgency was assembled from multiple sources throughout the 
region. Taliban leadership mobilized recruiters to find volunteers in refugee camps, 
mosques, Pashtun villages throughout Afghanistan, and madrasas throughout the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan.94 
1. Shabnamah—Night Letters 
When the insurgency amassed enough fighters, they slowly began their campaign 
to regain influence of Afghans throughout the country. Reappearing outside of their former 
strategic headquarters in 2002, Steve Coll describes the calculated return of the Taliban to 
Afghanistan:  
The first Taliban Shabnamah, or night letters—typically handwritten death 
threats posted in mosques or slipped under doorways—appeared to the east 
of Kandahar late in 2002, near the Pakistani border. They made reference 
to the history of the Afghan resistance against foreign invaders, great heroes 
of the past, and Islamic theology. They threatened death to anyone who 
worked with the United States or the government in Kabul. Taliban runners 
tacked them on mosque walls or private doorways, or demanded that local 
notables read them aloud.95 
The Taliban’s choice to use Shabnamah was a deliberate decision that appealed to 
historical and tribal traditions of the Afghan people, especially those in rural regions from 
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where the Taliban drew large parts of their insurgency. As Thomas H. Johnson notes, the 
letters were also the most effective means of reaching the highly-illiterate rural 
communities who depended on oral communication. Furthermore, the narratives of Afghan 
heroes and allusions to the anti-Soviet jihad worked to mobilize Afghans against U.S. 
troops.96 The Taliban’s understanding of the Afghan people and their culture, as evidenced 
by the issuance of night letters, was an integral aspect of the insurgency’s return and future 
success against culturally-deaf counterinsurgents. 
Reminiscent of Mao Tse-tung’s, On Guerilla Warfare, night letters signify one of 
the first and most important strategic markers of the Taliban’s new insurgent methodology. 
Having suffered catastrophic losses in their fight against the modern U.S. military in 2001, 
the Taliban recognized the need to use guerilla tactics to counter the strength and lethality 
of conventional U.S. forces.  
2. Intelligence Networks  
Although the Taliban had found new ways to appeal to rural Afghans, they lacked 
the forces and equipment needed to effectively counter U.S. troops in armed engagements. 
Unlike the unity they cultivated in the mid-1990s, the recruits of the “Neo-Taliban” were 
disordered, indiscriminately violent, and struggled to create a positive environment among 
their ranks.97 Coupled with inferior troop numbers, these factors detracted from the overall 
military success of the insurgency as they attempted to reestablish control in southern 
Afghanistan.  
To counter the inefficiency of their militias, the Taliban developed extensive 
networks for intelligence throughout the Afghan countryside. Capitalizing on the 
lawlessness of regional governments due to Karzai’s policies, the Taliban connected with 
tribal villagers as they had against the mujahedeen warlords in the earliest days of the 
insurgency. Giustozzi notes the importance of these networks, explaining, “While unable 
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to convince even most of their former members to re-mobilize for war, the Taliban 
managed to obtain from them valuable intelligence on the political situation, the divisions 
among their enemies and the grievances of the population, which they set out to exploit.”98  
The intelligence networks created in the early period of the Taliban’s reemergence 
would come to support the insurgency for the next decade of conflict. Furthermore, the 
Taliban’s ability to recognize their military shortfalls and to adapt their strategy to support 
their strengths shows the growing sophistication of their tactics.  
3. Organization 
After taking control of Kabul in 1996, Mullah Omar slowly learned the importance 
of organization and structure in managing his widespread insurgency. In 2003, Omar 
worked to prevent similar issues and created a council of confidants to help supervise the 
growing arms of the Taliban. In On Guerilla Warfare, Mao highlights the importance of a 
divisional structure writing: 
In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, 
and there must be no excessive interference with their activities…Only 
adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. 
Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of regular 
forces, and tactically, they must cooperate with adjacent units of the regular 
army.99 
Omar’s council appointed leaders for matters regarding finance, military 
operations, governance, religion, and other important divisions, but allowed basic forces to 
work somewhat independently.100 The new organization allowed Omar to oversee the 
movements of the insurgency but gave him the freedom to focus a majority of his attention 
on grand strategy.  
At first, the organizational structure implemented by Omar lacked continuity as 
U.S. forces killed or captured high-ranking Taliban operatives in charge of Taliban 
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divisions. However, by the mid-2000s, the structure evolved into a hierarchy of local, 
regional, and executive leaders. So, if a Taliban insurgent was eliminated, his position 
could efficiently be filled by the lower-level leader.  
From 2001 to 2004, the Taliban utilized a trial-and-error method as they worked to 
revolutionize their insurgency. Taliban leadership found tactics and methods that worked 
with the ideological goals of the insurgency and then adapted them to ensure optimal 
success. This period of experimentation was integral in the success that the Taliban enjoyed 
from 2005-2009. 
C. THE HEIGHT OF TALIBAN INNOVATION: 2005–2009 
Mullah Omar and his council of leadership had spent several years compiling 
extensive research on the U.S. military and their fighting doctrines, developing lethal 
technologies, and fine-tuning the logistical networks of their insurgency. In 2005, the 
profits of their labor were apparent as the Taliban swept across Afghanistan and dealt 
consecutive and significant attacks on coalition forces in the country. 
The period between 2005 and 2009 illustrates the epitome of Taliban adaptation 
and innovation.101 Compiling the lessons of the first decade of their insurgency, especially 
their swift defeat by OEF forces, Mullah Omar modified the Taliban’s ideologies and 
methodologies to return as a more effective insurgency in pursuit of their goals. 
1. Utilization of Improvised Explosive Devices and Suicide Bombers 
One of the most lethal adaptations made by the Taliban was the development of 
low-cost improvised explosive device (IED) technologies and the use of suicide bombers. 
In 2005, the Taliban met with a group of insurgents traveling from Iraq to Afghanistan. 
These insurgents brought with them information regarding the successful employment of 
IEDs and suicide bombing against American troops in Iraq.102 The use of such strategies 
in Afghanistan was uncommon, but the Taliban were in need of new measures to counter 
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the conventional U.S. military. The insurgent’s employment of these tactics resulted in 
nearly half of American casualties in Iraq in the early and mid-2000s.103 Recognizing the 
strategic advantage these devices had, the Taliban began to incorporate the tactics into their 
new fighting doctrine. 
IEDs revolutionized Taliban tactics due to their efficient and inexpensive nature. 
The supplies needed to build IEDs were often found around the house and could be 
connected to basic remote-activating devices. A report conducted by the Congressional 
Research Service explains the simplicity of IED technology, “Triggering methods include 
using a cell phone, a garage door opener, or a child’s radio-controlled toy, or may be as 
simple as running over a rubber hose to produce enough air pressure to activate a detonating 
switch.”104 Additionally, the remote activation of IEDs allowed the Taliban to detonate 
the bombs will concealing themselves from counter-fire and blast shrapnel. Although the 
bombs were low cost to the insurgents who utilized them, they resulted in the destruction 
of million dollar armored vehicles and the loss of hundreds of U.S. service members’ lives.  
The Taliban also found new ways to pair IED technology with the deadly effects of 
suicide bombers. Using remote detonating devices, the Taliban could detonate suicide vests 
in crowded public centers to illustrate the Afghan government’s inability to protect its 
citizens.105 Despite ethical questions raised within the Taliban leadership circles, the 
effectiveness of IEDs and suicide bombing could not be ignored. As a result, a 500% 
increase in the use of these tactics occurred in in 2006.106  
The Taliban’s implementation of IEDs and suicide bombings illustrates the 
insurgency’s willingness to adjust their cultural practices to meet their political and military 
objectives and shows the substantial evolution in the group’s policies since 1994. 
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2. Ambushes and Small Group Tactics 
Although the Taliban used innovative new tactics like IEDs and suicide bombers 
to assist their military campaigns, in many regions the Taliban still fought like a 
conventional force. Outnumbered and overpowered by large coalition forces and modern 
weaponry, these tactics often led to mass casualties within the Taliban ranks.107 
Describing the movements of small insurgent groups, Mao writes:   
The leader must be like the fisherman, who, with his nets, is able both to 
cast them and to pull them out in awareness of the depth of the water, the 
strength of the current, or the presence of any obstructions that may foul 
them. As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the 
guerrilla leader maintains contact with and control over his units. As the 
fisherman must change his position, so must the guerrilla commander. 
Dispersion, concentration, constant change of position—it is in these ways 
the guerrillas employ their strength.108 
Taliban forces were outnumbered in Afghanistan, but they were experts of the 
Afghan landscape and found new ways to exploit their knowledge effectively against 
counterinsurgents. As Mao advises, the Taliban began to move quickly through the 
mountainous territories of the country and planned attacks and ambushes that they could 
control. Meanwhile, U.S. conventional forces moved sluggishly, weighed down by heavy 
equipment, hindered by poor roadways, and slowed by constant sweeps for IEDs. The slow 
movements of the counterinsurgents allowed Taliban units to trap conveys, retreat, and 
quickly move insurgents to their next location for preparation of continued attacks.  
3. Airstrikes  
U.S. troops in Afghanistan quickly grew frustrated with the Taliban’s new tactics 
as suffered from high numbers of American casualties as the Taliban disappeared into the 
Afghan villages seemingly uninjured. In response, the U.S. increased patrols and attempted 
to draw the Taliban out with an increased presence throughout the country.  
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Additionally, American military strategists began to favor the use of airstrikes in 
Afghanistan in hopes of targeting Taliban forces while lessening the number of American 
servicemen at risk on the ground. However, instead of eliminating Taliban forces and 
leadership, coalition airstrikes resulted in the collateral deaths of Afghan civilians. In 2006 
alone, coalition airstrikes were responsible for the deaths of over 100 Afghans. In 2007, 
that number tripled to over 300 Afghans killed by airstrikes.109 The fallout of Afghan 
casualties from coalition airstrikes was substantial. International organizations grew 
progressively critical of U.S. military policies, the Afghan government began to speak out 
against U.S. efforts in the country, and Afghan locals increasingly resented the presence of 
OEF troops in Afghanistan.110  
D. THE SURGE AND U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
In his 2009 article “One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan,” 
U.S. Army Major, Jim Gant, described the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. He 
explains: 
Time is not on our side considering the current level of blood and treasure 
that we are expending. A war of exhaustion is unacceptable and a war of 
annihilation is not feasible. We do not have the patience or the resources to 
stay on our current course. The sophistication of Taliban attacks in 
Afghanistan has risen in the last two years to a point where we can clearly 
see that they will continue to adapt to our strategies and tactics.111 
The criticisms mentioned in Gant’s article were also concerns of American military 
planners in 2009. The U.S. recognized the failures of their counterinsurgency strategy, 
modeled mostly after doctrines used in Vietnam, and attempted to create a new doctrine 
that would finally eliminate Taliban influence and bring an end to the conflict in 
Afghanistan.  
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In January 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama took office and immediately began 
strategizing for the war in Afghanistan, which he vowed to end while campaigning for the 
oval office. The policy that emerged from the White House called for a surge in U.S. troops 
to Afghanistan, adding nearly 30,000 servicemen and women on the ground in 
Afghanistan. Obama’s plan was to increase troop presence for roughly one year to 
overwhelm Taliban forces, then facilitate the gradual removal of troops from the country 
with the exception of peacekeepers and government advisors.112  
In coordination with the surge in troops, the U.S. began implementing Field Manual 
3-24. The Field Manual was written by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in 2006 and 
focused on filling a decades-long doctrinal gap in counterinsurgency doctrine.113 In other 
words, the U.S. military had been operating in Afghanistan for eight years without a 
warfighting doctrine specific to the country’s landscape, culture, religion, or people. A fact 
the Taliban had capitalized on for eight years.114 
FM 3-24 recognized the failures in U.S. policies in Afghanistan and called on the 
literature and expertise of major counterinsurgency specialists to explain the way forward 
for future engagements. However, the suggestions within the field manual countered 
traditional military norms, placed new responsibilities in the hands of low-ranking soldiers, 
and focused on social and cultural expertise not trained in boot camp.115 Academic critics 
of FM 3-24 noted that doctrine pared down broader social and cultural concepts in an 
attempt to simplify theories, but in turn over generalized important ideas.116  Moreover, 
FM 3-24 highlighted the expensive and protracted nature of counterinsurgency success 
despite rapidly decreasing public support and record-hitting military budgets at home.  
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E. CONCLUSION  
Between 2004 and 2009, the Taliban reached the pinnacle of adaptation as the U.S. 
and coalition troops struggled to achieve progress against IEDs, suicide bombers, 
ambushes, rapidly maneuvering small groups, and decreasing Afghan and international 
support. Learning from the mistakes of early 2000, Mullah Omar and the Taliban 
systematically modified nearly every aspect of their insurgency to counter the modern 
military power of the U.S. and their allies.  
It should be noted that the Taliban did see periods of weakness during this time. 
Bitterness between regional commanders, distaste over oppressive sharia laws and 
fundamentalist ideologies, and the capture or killing of many Taliban operatives occurred 
throughout the early and mid-2000s.117 These difficulties led to new stresses on the 
Taliban organization, especially among the top-level leadership. Nevertheless, the 
insurgency found ways to mitigate the drawbacks of these weaknesses and continued to 
wage their jihad against the U.S. will overwhelming success. 
As the U.S. refocused their efforts on supporting the governmental infrastructure 
and political stability of Afghanistan, recommendations highlighted in FM 3-24, the 
Taliban were again forced to evolve their insurgency.  
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V. POLITICAL INGENUITY 
The political atmosphere in Afghanistan in 2010 was highly fragmented and riddled 
with corruption, signs that not much had changed since 1992. After serving as the 
transitional president of Afghanistan following the Bonn Agreement, Hamid Karzai was 
democratically elected as President of Afghanistan in 2004. He immediately set to work on 
enhancing the economic and political infrastructure in Afghanistan, with the help of the 
United States and the international community. Millions of dollars of aid flooded into 
Afghanistan to support development projects that were intended to bring Afghanistan into 
the 21st century and neutralize the influence of the Taliban. However, the mismanagement 
of money, the inefficiency of Afghan governmental ministries, and the continued threat of 
violence prohibited meaningful progress.  
Again, following the guidelines set forward in Mao’s On Guerilla Warfare, the 
Taliban transformed their organization to meet the growing needs of the insurgency. Mao 
advises: 
The soldier must be educated politically. There must be a gradual change 
from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The 
necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. 
At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of sustainable 
supply, medical, and hygiene units.118 
While the government of Afghanistan attempted to modernize and liberalize, the 
Taliban set out to revolutionize their structure and ideologies as well. Organizational 
alterations that began in 2008 transitioned the Taliban away from a patrimonial structure 
and more towards a centralized structure.119 This substantial change paved the way for a 
more uniformed and effective Taliban political divisions. Additionally, the Taliban began 
to adopt new ideologies in matters such as governance, technology, and public services 
that would allow them to undermine progress made by the central government in Kabul. 
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These changes, when compared to the Taliban of 1994, illustrate the ideological and 
political ingenuity of the Taliban from 2010 to 2019. 
A. TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT 
In 2010, the Taliban issued a code of conduct, or layeha, for their fighters that 
outlined acceptable insurgent practices throughout their organization in Afghanistan. The 
2010 layeha was not the first code of conduct issued by Taliban leadership. Previous layeha 
editions were distributed in 2006 and 2009. However, the 2010 edition was far more 
expansive and detailed than previous versions. The updated code called for the 
development of new Taliban ideologies and signified a shift in the insurgency’s priorities.  
Major topics of the 2010 layeha include the growth of network communications, 
increasing public support, the importance of political commissions, and an emphasis on the 
defection of government personnel.120 Furthermore, the code prohibited actions such as 
kidnapping and extortion, which were previously common practices among insurgents. 
Now, the Taliban believed such actions damaged the insurgency’s image. The removal of 
indiscriminate violence and corruption were also major shifts that worked to change the 
culture of the Taliban in Afghanistan and to bring legitimacy to their movement.   
Discussing the narratives utilized by the Taliban organization, Johnson describes 
the need for an organizational shift: 
The Taliban have suffered politically from engaging in barbaric, ultra-
violent, and un-Islamic methods such as beheadings and mutilating 
civilians. While this method may have short-term advantages in garnering 
support from certain foreign donors or outbidding among competing 
insurgent groups, it has had detrimental long-term strategic effects on 
Taliban efforts at gaining support among rural comminutes.121 
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The recognition of the pitfalls mentioned by Johnson led to the sweeping changes 
of the revised code of conduct. This particular adaptation made by the Taliban was 
necessary for further progress in Afghanistan.   
Moreover, the 2010 layeha represents a major shift in the Taliban organization 
towards becoming a multifaceted government equipped with the resources and programs 
necessary to support a population. The appointment of governors with civil-service 
experience and the emphasis on efficient political processes show the Taliban’s desire to 
undermine the political structures of the central government in Afghanistan.122   
B. U.S. LOSES PUBLIC SUPPORT 
In contrast to the evolving Taliban code of conduct, the U.S. faced new challenges 
in Afghanistan as members of the military irreparably damaged U.S.-Afghan relations. 
 As more troops arrived in Afghanistan as a part of the surge, the U.S. hoped to 
bolster Afghan security efforts and to restore stability and peace to Afghan towns 
throughout the country. Utilizing FM 3-24, members of OEF attempted to cultivate 
relationships with Afghan villagers as a means of reducing Taliban influence and coercion. 
However, despite the cultural and religious sensitivity addressed in FM 3-24, U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan faced severe criticism following three appalling events between 2011 and 
2012.  
In the summer of 2011, as the Taliban discussed the possibility of talks with the 
U.S. and Afghan governments, a video surfaced of four U.S. Marines urinating on the dead 
bodies of several Taliban insurgents. The video was posted online and viewed by Afghans 
throughout the country. President Karzai called for stern punishment of the Marines, the 
Taliban issued a statement that referred to the acts as “in contradiction with all human and 
ethical norms,” and led to increases in anti-American sentiment among Afghans throughout 
the country.123  
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In February 2012, U.S. officials at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan 
authorized the burning of Qurans that they believed were being used by prisoners to pass 
messages. The Quran is the holiest text of the Islamic religion, and it’s burning enraged 
Muslims around the world an especially those in Afghanistan.  When news of the burning 
reached the press, riots formed around the country resulting in the deaths of nearly thirty 
people and injuring dozens more.124 
In March 2012, Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales left his base in Panjwai, 
Afghanistan, and walked into several Afghan homes shooting and burning the bodies of 
sixteen Afghans, nine of which were children.125 The event became known as the Panjwai 
Massacre and considerably impacted U.S.-Afghan relations in the region. 
Each of these acts received a large amount of media attention in Afghanistan and 
around the world. Afghans lost trust in American motives and many rioted outside military 
bases calling for an end to U.S. involvement in the country.  
The Taliban, however, in line with their new code of conduct, were able to 
capitalize on the mistakes of the U.S. military. Taliban insurgents continued narratives that 
the U.S. was against the religion of Islam.  
C. GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
While the U.S. attempted to repair relationships with Afghans in the wake of the 
events of 2011 and 2012, the Taliban worked to build on anti-American feelings within the 
country. In line with the objectives outlined in the 2010 layeha, the Taliban began to focus 
on the growth of social programs around this time. Educational opportunities, healthcare 
systems and attempts to provide justice began to spread in Taliban-controlled territories 
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around 2011, and the popularity of such efforts increased as the U.S. lost legitimacy in the 
region.126 
1. Transformed Taliban Methodology 
The Taliban of the late 1990s and early 2000s were characterized by oppressive 
violence, removal of modern technology, destruction of education facilities, and poor 
healthcare. But, as the government of Afghanistan received aid and assistance to provide 
social welfare programs to Afghans, the Taliban’s earlier policies could no longer support 
the goals of the insurgency. Therefore, they set out to create a structure that would win 
over the population, as they had in 1994.  
In a report conducted by the Overseas Development Institute, the author explains 
the actions taken by the Taliban to enter the political arena in Afghanistan. The report 
explains: 
Provisions recommending attacks on teachers, schools and NGOs were 
replaced by stipulations compelling adherence to the ‘policies’ of the 
Islamic Emirate, including education…Attitudes toward aid agencies and 
service providers also appear to have shifted…a letter issued in Mullah 
Omar’s name, and similar letters or directives for subsequent campaigns, 
instructed fighters to allow vaccinations and urged parents to have their 
children vaccinated…By 2011, the Taliban leadership had signed 
agreements with at least 26 aid organisations and elaborated a clear central 
policy for negotiating with NGOs.127 
The vast modifications to Taliban policies represent a major shift in the evolution 
of the Taliban insurgency, further supporting the sophistication of the organization. The 
Taliban of 1998, who struggled to support Afghans and provide services without the help 
of the international community, were now partnering with major aid organizations to bring 
education and healthcare to tribal citizens. At the highest level, commissions on finance, 
health, education, and a three-tiered judicial commission were led by the main leadership 
council. Provincial and district councils worked under the main council to govern territories 
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in line with leadership’s directives. At the lowest level, district councils even had means 
for appointing mayors, selecting school and medical monitors, and collecting taxes.128 
The benefits of the Taliban’s new policies were most apparent in the rural regions 
of Afghanistan where the central government struggled to provide timely judiciary 
decisions. Johnson and DuPee note that the Taliban’s judicial system “represents a parallel 
legal system that is acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, fair, free of 
bribery, and swift,” which were qualities not used by many Afghans to describe the judicial 
processes in Kabul.129 A rural farmer filing an appeal over land rights would wait months 
or even years before a decision was made in Kabul regarding the farmer’s appeal. The 
Taliban were able to provide immediate judicial decisions, allowing the Afghans to return 
to their farms and work without the bureaucratic lag that was characteristic of Karzai’s 
government. 
2. Death of Mullah Omar 
In the summer of 2015, the Taliban revealed that their Supreme Leader, Mullah 
Omar died two years prior in 2013. Questions regarding Omar’s replacement and the future 
of the insurgency reportedly led to a decline in the progress of Taliban objectives.130  
Furthermore, some Taliban have completely broken off from the greater insurgency 
structure. Fighters in some regions work independently from the directives issued by the 
new Taliban leadership in order to pursue their own specific goals.131  
However, the announcement of Omar’s death came as the U.S. and coalition forces 
committed to a drawdown in military presence in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the Taliban 
were given a period of decreased conflict to regroup following the leader’s death and to 
prepare for the future of the group. 
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3. Ashraf Ghani as President of Afghanistan 
After serving as President of Afghanistan for thirteen years, Hamid Karzai was 
replaced by Ashraf Ghani who won the contested democratic election of 2014. The election 
received international attention for accusations of corruption and fraud.132 Due to 
discrepancies in election results Ghani, and the next highest vote-getter, Abdullah 
Abdullah, agreed to a power-sharing partnership. Ghani received the title of president and 
Abdullah was named as his chief executive. In a run-off election to establish a majority 
winner, nearly one million votes were labeled invalid and thrown out of consideration.133  
The government of Afghanistan under the direction of President Ghani has seen a 
considerable decline. Although Ghani calls his administration the National Unity 
Government, the country is more fragmented than it has been in nearly a decade. Afghans 
are increasingly angry with the poor security state, lack of peace, a stagnating economy, 
and institutional corruption that stopped progress within the country.134  
In attempts to create peace with the Taliban, Ghani spent a considerable period of 
his early presidency struggling to conduct negotiations with insurgency leadership.135 
However, peace talks and cease-fire agreements with insurgent forces were consistently 
unsuccessful. Often times, the Taliban used ceasefires to reorganize and reequip fighters 
before continuing assaults on territories. Additionally, the Taliban continued to exploit the 
failures of the central government and while promoting the efficiency of their shadow 
government structure.  
A report conducted by the Brookings Institute cited interviews with Afghans, 
finding that, “the modern and presumably transformative Afghan generation would be 
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willing to settle for some form of Taliban rule, though with limits to the Taliban’s power, 
with the hope that the Taliban in power would be less corrupt than the post-2001 Afghan 
politicians.”136 The appeal of the Taliban government illustrates the substantial progress 
in the Taliban’s goals of undermining the National Unity Government. 
4. U.S. Presidential Election of 2016  
In November 2016, the U.S. elected Donald Trump as President. Historically, 
Trump was unsupportive of the U.S.’ continued involvement in Afghanistan. On the 
campaign trail, he campaigned for the removal of U.S. troops in the run-up to his election.  
Despite his campaign promises, the Trump administration’s policy for Afghanistan 
shifted significantly after taking office in 2017. In August 2017, President Trump 
announced his Afghanistan strategy, which called for an increase of troops to the country, 
reminiscent of the smaller-scale surge strategies of the Obama administration. Trump’s 
new strategy hoped to push back insurgent forces, promote stability, and develop the 
capabilities of Afghan security forces.  
The next month, in September 2017, the U.S. military carried out over 700 airstrikes 
in Afghanistan, the highest strike numbers since 2010.137 But, as seen before, the airstrikes 
had adverse effects and resulted in an increase of civilian casualties.  
Changing their strategy again, in July 2018, the Trump Administration announced 
their desire to engage in direct negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. A decision that 
inherently gives significant political legitimacy to the Taliban organization in Afghanistan.  
The administration’s initial timeline called for a peace deal by April 2019, prior to 
Afghanistan’s presidential election planned for September 2019.  
Spearheaded by the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay 
Khalilzad, the U.S. and Taliban have met several times throughout 2018 and 2019 to 
discuss the future of Afghanistan. The Taliban have stated that the removal of all U.S. 
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military troops in Afghanistan must occur before political negotiations would begin. For 
the U.S. to consider the peace talks a success, the Taliban must agree to prevent the growth 
or sheltering of international terrorist groups in Afghanistan.  
While the U.S. and Taliban leaders have met several times, they have excluded 
delegations from Afghanistan’s government in their negotiations. The Taliban have refused 
to meet with an official delegation from President Ghani’s administration as they believe 
his presidency is illegitimate.138  
D. CONCLUSION 
Between 2010 and 2019, the Taliban organization fundamentally transformed from 
a military insurgency into a political organization that rivaled the central government of 
Afghanistan. The death of the insurgency’s spiritual leader, Mullah Omar, slowed the 
insurgency only momentarily.  
Continued recognition of strengths and weaknesses in the Taliban’s structure, 
methodology, and ideology have allowed the insurgency to adapt and benefit from changes 
occurring throughout Afghanistan in the last several years.  
Nearly two decades after U.S. forces obliterated the Taliban regime, representatives 
from both sides of the conflict sit together in negotiations for peace. While the Taliban has 
suffered from several phases of dominance and retreat, their ability to evolve into a multi-
layered political entity has ensured their long-term existence in Afghanistan. 
  
 
                                                 
138 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to Jump-Start Afghan 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
61 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As of June 2019, the Taliban have not reached a deal with U.S. negotiators, 
although officials claim an agreement could come very soon. The Taliban insist on the 
complete removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, while the U.S. demands a pledge to 
prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist networks. In May 2019, the 
U.S. and Taliban spokespeople announced “positive and constructive” progress in their 
sixth round of negotiations.139  
While positive negotiations with the U.S. could bring American troops home from 
Afghanistan after nearly two decades of war, the stability of Afghanistan is still 
questionable. The absence of Afghan political leadership in peace talks signifies a major 
missing piece in the future of the country and shows the U.S.’ failure to learn from their 
mistakes in Vietnam. Only two years after the U.S. negotiated with North Vietnamese 
troops, without the presence of South Vietnamese officials, the government fell in 1975.140 
The deliberate exclusion of Ghani’s administration is not a positive marker for success in 
Afghanistan even if the U.S. and Taliban representatives reach an agreement amongst 
themselves. 
Although the Taliban have evolved and adapted to the changing Afghan 
environment, much of the country mirrors the conditions of the 1990s. The ethnic and tribal 
divisions that separated Afghanistan and gave way to the rise of the Taliban are still present. 
Political representatives struggle to support the majority of the electorate as ethnic groups 
support their own agendas and candidates. Corruption among political groups continues to 
hinder progress as it did after the removal of Soviet political figures in 1992. Democratic 
elections in Afghanistan have continually been delayed due to violence and corruption, 
especially by President Ghani and his administration. Intervention by international 
organizations and governments fail to create long-lasting progress, similar to the efforts of 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
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Today, February 10, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/02/10/afghanistan-peace-talks-
taliban-vietnam-war-editorials-debates/2776978002/. 
62 
the Clinton administration and UN in the late 1990s. Despite several trillions of dollars of 
aid and decades of American intervention, the country continually fails to provide everyday 
Afghans with basic democratic entitlements.  
The upcoming U.S. presidential election in 2020 will likely bring more changes for 
the future of Afghanistan policy. Both President Obama and President Trump campaigned 
on the removal of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and both have walked back their 
commitments with increased deployments and attacks in the country.  
Furthermore, the U.S. public has largely lost interest in the future of Afghanistan. 
In a poll by Rasmussen Reports, only 58% of those likely to vote knew the U.S. was still 
involved in counterinsurgency and military operations in Afghanistan.141 The relevance of 
foreign policy in Afghanistan that existed in the early 2000s is no longer present. The 
possibility of troop deployments to Iran has taken over media concerns.  
The sincerity of Taliban peace negotiations is unknown. Some experts believe 
Taliban perceptions of exhaustion and disunity signify genuine interest in the peace 
process.142 However, the Taliban have shown that they can capitalize on the safety of 
cease-fire agreements to return better trained and equipped to continue their ideological 
jihad. Additionally, although moderate members of the Taliban may engage in peace 
agreements, the more radical and fundamentalist members may continue to bring terror to 
Afghanistan.  
Regardless of the outcomes of the continuing peace process, the U.S. must learn 
from their experiences in Afghanistan. U.S. forces entered Afghanistan will relatively zero 
understanding of the complex landscape of the Afghan country and will no plan for the 
long-term future of the country. The use of outdated doctrine and strategies, applied to a 
misunderstood Afghan situation resulted in the loss of thousands of American lives.   
                                                 
141 “Do Voters Know We’re Still At War With Afghanistan?” Rasmussen Reports, July 30, 2018, 
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Future planning for military engagements, specifically those involving 
counterinsurgency, must look to the failures of Afghanistan for guidance. Mao’s handbook 
on guerrilla warfare has remained applicable for over half a century and has helped to 
defeat conventional militaries, including the U.S. for just as long due to an inability to learn 
from insurgent behaviors.  
The U.S. must learn to act swiftly and efficiently, to adapt to changes in operational 
tempo, and to consider the cultural nuances of host nations much as insurgents do. Until 
those challenges can be matched with effective and evolutionary military doctrine, the U.S. 
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